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Abstract
Across the country, municipalities are updating their public service
agencies with the addition of advanced “911” emergency telephone
systems.
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I. Introduction
Across the country, municipalities are updating their public ser-
vice agencies with the addition of advanced "911" emergency telephone
systems.' The systems are designed to immediately dispatch assistance
to community members who have become victims of tragedy. Reduced
response time offered by the "911" system is the primary reason for its
popularity.2
As a result of municipal involvement in implementation of "911"
systems, local governments operating emergency assistance systems
may suffer tort liability for negligent failure to properly respond to a
call. 3 Jurisdictions responding to this dilemma have done so differently.
Courts holding municipalities liable in tort for mishandling "911" calls
predicate their findings on the special duty doctrine4 and the waiver of
sovereign immunity. 5 Other jurisdictions relieve municipalities of all li-
ability based on the doctrines of public duty6 and common law govern-
mental immunity.7
With other jurisdictions responding differently to the issue of
whether tort liability should attach, predicting how Florida courts will
1. There are more than 1,100 "911" systems on line serving more than 45% of
United States residents. Hackworth, 9-1-1: Antidote to Amnesia, 1984 JEMS 24. In
1984, 67.5% of the citizens from thirty-one Florida counties were served by "911" sys-
tems. Division of Communications, State of Florida Department of General Services,
Florida 911 Program (1984). Presently, approximately one-half of Florida's counties,
nearly 80% of Florida's citizens, are served by "911" systems. Telephone interview with
Edward J. Telander, P.E., Communications Engineer, Division of Communications
(Dec. 4, 1985).
2. "Response time has different meanings. It can be 1) the time an incident oc-
curs to the time it is reported, 2) the time it is reported until help is dispatched, or 3)
the time dispatch occurs until help arrives at the scene." Because the person dialing
only has to dial three numbers rather than seven, reporting time is shorter. Also, all
calls go to one center equipped with a multitude of emergency resources utilized to
reduce dispatch time. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Ashman, Negligent 911 Goof-up Proves Costly in New York, 69 A.B.A. J. 354
(Mar. 1983).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-22.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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respond is a difficult task. The Florida legislature has taken affirmative
action in developing a statewide emergency telephone assistance plan,8
and has also waived municipal sovereign immunity in tort actions.9 Al-
though the Florida Supreme Court seems to have given new life to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County,1" the district courts of appeal still ponder the decision's
full effects.
This note demonstrates the potential for civil action against Flor-
ida municipalities for failing to properly respond to emergency assis-
tance calls. This note predicts how Florida courts may respond to this
dilemma. In addition, this note will provide an approach which includes
compensating victims of mishandled emergency calls while deferring to
the intent of Florida's legislature.
A. Historical Overview of Florida Municipal Liability
Florida municipalities have not always enjoyed sovereign immu-
nity1 to the extent the state has. Prior to the enactment of Florida's
8. FLA. STAT. § 365.171 (1985).
9. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1985). The statute provides in part:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for
itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immu-
nity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Ac-
tions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to re-
cover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies
or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivi-
sion, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance
with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limi-
tations specified in this act. Any such action may be brought in the county
where the property in litigation is located or, if the affected agency or
subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary
business, where the cause of action accrued.
10. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
11. This article does not purport to cover the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
depth. For an historical overview of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Van Al-
styne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu, 15
STAN. L. REv. 163 (1962); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Spader, Immunity v. Liability and the Clash of
Fundamental Values: Ancient Mysteries Crying Out for Understanding, 61 CHi.-KENT
1320 [Vol. 10
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/12
1986]
waiver statute, traditional common law municipal immunity only at-
tached for governmental functions, as opposed to proprietary functions.
Governmental functions are those functions exercised on behalf of the
state for the benefit of the general public1 2 or those done in furtherance
of the public welfare.1 3 Thus, while pursuing this type of state objec-
tive, a municipality was shielded from tort action.
A municipality was subject to tort liability if injury resulted from
the negligent performance of a proprietary function. Proprietary func-
tions are "those done for the public's convenience and enjoyment."1 4
When a municipality is performing functions for the specific benefit of
a community embraced within its municipal boundaries rather than for
the general public, the municipality is exercising a proprietary func-
tion. 15 Thus, under the governmental-proprietary distinction, only tor-
tious acts committed in furtherance of a proprietary function were
actionable.
Municipal liability in Florida has also been predicated on the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.16 The governmental- proprietary distinc-
tion was totally ignored in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.'7 The
Florida Supreme Court held that an individual suffering injury as a
direct result of a municipal employee's negligence would have an ac-
tionable claim against the municipality, as long as the employee acted
within the scope of his employment. However, the court did continue to
recognize immunity for municipalities for actions taken in the exercise
of judicial, legislative, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial functions. 8
Although respondeat superior remains a separate tort claim in Florida
for municipal liability, the application is greatly restricted.
The special duty doctrine, as developed by the Florida Supreme
L. REV. 61 (1985).
12. Budetti & Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of Municipal
Tort Liability, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 927, 928 (1978).
13. Note, How Much Wrong Can the King Do? A Look at the Modern Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrine in Florida, 13 STETSON L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1984).
14. Id. at 361.
15. Budetti & Knight, supra note 12, at 929.
16. The scope of this article does not pursue the tort action of respondeat supe-
rior in detail. See, e.g., Comment, Employer Liability For Assaults By Employees, 48
Mo. L. REV. 655 (1983); Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fel-
low Servant Rule, 1837-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (1984).
17. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
18. Id. at 133.
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Court in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,19 supplanted the governmen-
tal-proprietary distinction as a premise for governmental immunity
from tort liability. The Modlin court limited those situations in which
an injured individual could recover from a municipality.2 ° Only when
the municipality or its employee owed a specific duty to the individual
complaining could the municipality's negligence be actionable.21 The
duty must be something more than that owed by a public officer to the
public generally.22
With little resistance, the special duty doctrine remained the
source of municipal tort liability until the Commercial Carrier Corp.
decision in 1979.23 Unsatisfied with the present state of municipal tort
law at that time, due in part to enactment of the sovereign immunity
statute, the Florida Supreme Court disposed of the special duty doc-
trine. Now when dealing with municipal liability, courts are to deter-
mine whether the decision to further governmental actions is accom-
plished at either a planning level or operational level.24 Negligence
resulting from furtherance of planning level decisions is not actionable
because the public importance of these decisions requires governmental
immunization from tort liability. However, any injuries incurred during
promotion of governmental interests at an operational level are subject
to tort liability. Because these acts are ministerial in nature, the sover-
eign immunity doctrine is inapplicable.
19. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
20. Id. at 76.
21. Id. at 75; see Sapp v. Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court held that before
a municipality could be held liable for the negligence of its employees, a special duty
must be shown. A special duty is something more than the duty a municipality owes
the general public. See also City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969). The Second District Court of Appeal decided that a municipality could be
liable in tort, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, only when the complainant was
in privity with the municipal employee.
22. Modlin, 201 So. 2d at 76. See, e.g., Evett v. Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court held the city owed no duty, other than that owed to
the general public, to plaintiff's decedent, killed by an intoxicated driver previously
stopped but released by police.
23. See Note, supra note 13, at 362-63. The Florida waiver statute was enacted
in 1975. Commercial Carrier Corp. was not decided until 1979. During this time pe-
riod, there was little deviation from the special duty doctrine. See generally Pennington
v. Serig, 353 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Metropolitan Dade County v.
Kelly, 348 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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Although the Commercial Carrier Corp. court attempted to settle
the confusion surrounding Florida municipal tort liability, the law
seems more unsettled now than previously. This uncertainty, which
arises from the lower courts' inability to distinguish planning level and
operational level functions, creates a dilemma when courts are faced
with a tort action arising out of a municipality's failure to properly
respond to a "911" emergency call. As the "911" issue has yet to re-
ceive judicial attention by Florida courts, the ensuant sections survey
how courts of other jurisdictions have reacted to cases involving a mu-
nicipality's failure to properly answer emergency calls.
B. Municipal Liability for Failing to Respond Properly to an
Emergency Assistance Call
A municipality's decision to develop a "911" emergency reporting
system to counter "increased incidence of crimes, accidents and medi-
cal emergencies, inadequacy of existing emergency reporting methods
and the continual growth and mobility of the population, 25 is benefi-
cial to recipients of the service. The "911" system, however, is not flaw-
less. Specific instances of the system's shortcomings have left courts
throughout the United States confronted with issues of negligence, mu-
nicipal tort liability and sovereign immunity in cases where emergency
calls are mishandled.
The New York Court of Appeals examined these issues in De
Long v. County of Erie.2" The De Long court upheld an award of dam-
ages to the husband and children of a woman brutally victimized in
their home by an intruder.27 The decedent, Amelia De Long, was in
her home on the morning of October 25.28 Hearing a burglar in her
home, she immediately dialed "911 ."29 After receiving assurance that
assistance had been dispatched, De Long remained in her home await-
ing police arrival.30 Unfortunately, the complaint writer incorrectly re-
corded the complaint.3" Emergency assistance was dispatched to an in-
25. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 24.
26. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
27. Id. at 304, 457 N.E.2d at 720, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
28. Id. at 300-01, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
29. Id. at 300, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
30. Id. at 301, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
31. Id. The complaint writer, after incorrectly recording the address, informed
the dispatcher to send police to 219 Victoria, in the City of Buffalo. Amelia De Long's
correct address was 319 Victoria, in the City of Kenmore.
1323
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correct address in the wrong city.32 The police finally arrived, but
Amelia De Long was pronounced dead on the scene.
33
Amelia De Long's family sued for negligence. Affirming the lower
court opinion, the court recognized that the county and city developed
a special relationship with Amelia De Long. 4 The city and the county
implemented a special emergency service designed to take calls at a
designated center and then relay them to the proper public safety
agency.3 5 The public safety agencies offered the "911" plan as the sys-
tem to utilize in an emergency situation.36 In addition, a dispatcher
personally assured the victim that help was on the way, furthering her
reliance upon police.37 These factors created a special duty38 owed to
the victim by the city and the county. Each entity breached its duty."
Thus, compensation was awarded to the victim's family for her wrong-
ful death.
The Washington Supreme Court has also confronted the issue of
32. Id.
33. Id. Kenmore police arrived on the scene after a neighbor made a direct call
to the police department. By the time paramedics arrived, the victim was dead.
34. Cf. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). The New York Court of Appeals held that the city was not
liable in tort to an assault victim who had requested police protection on a number of
previous occasions. "[T] here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper alloca-
tion of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve
out an area in tort liability for police protection to members of the public." Id. at 583,
240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899. But see Judge Keating dissenting: "[tihe
essence of the city's case [suggests] . . . '[b]ecause we owe a duty to everybody, we
owe a duty to nobody.'" Id. at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
35. De Long, 60 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 457 N.E.2d at 720-21, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614-
15.
36. Id. at 302, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
37. Id. at 301, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
38. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The city was liable for the wrongful death of plaintiffs intestate.
An actionable special duty was created when police failed to provide promised protec-
tion after decedent aided police in arresting and convicting a fugitive from justice. See
also supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
39. De Long, 60 N.Y.2d at 305, 457 N.E.2d at 722, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 616. Also,
at the time this action was instituted by Dennis De Long, there was in existence,
within the laws of New York, a waiver of immunity statute. N.Y. JuRIsDIcTION LAW §
8 (McKinney 1983), in part, provides that "[t]he state hereby waives its immunity
from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the su-
preme court against individuals or corporations ... " However, the De Long court
never referenced this statute in its opinion.
1324 [Vol. 10
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/12
19861
police failure to properly respond to an emergency call. In Chambers-
Castanes v. King County,40 plaintiffs, a married couple, were proceed-
ing through a small Washington town when they were stopped in traffic
behind a pick-up truck.41 Two men exited the truck and began to man-
handle the couple.42 When the men finally retreated from the scene, the
wife phoned for assistance.4 3 After numerous calls requesting assis-
tance, police finally responded to the call.44 Unfortunately, the assail-
ants fled, avoiding apprehension.45
In plaintiffs' action for negligence, the Chambers-Castanes court
concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was inapplicable
and held King County subject to liability in tort.46 Because the legisla-
ture had abolished the sovereign immunity doctrine,47 the court carved
out a narrowly circumscribed exception.48 High level discretionary acts
exercised at an executive level remained cloaked with sovereign immu-
nity.49 In comparison, operational level decisions, such as dispatching a
police officer to the scene of a crime, were not cloaked with immunity.50
The two are distinguished as follows: a decision to dispatch an officer in
response to an emergency call involves the type of discretion exercised
every day,51 not a decision involving a basic governmental planning
consideration. 52 Therefore, the operator's failure to properly dispatch
40. 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).
41. Id. at 278, 669 P.2d at 454.
42. Id.
43. Id. A number of other persons witnessing the events also phoned for police
assistance. They were assured, as was plaintiff, that help was on its way.
44. Id. at 280, 669 P.2d at 454.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 281, 669 P.2d at 457. The Washington Supreme Court has accepted
the test established in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246,
250, 407 P.2d 440, 444 (1965), as an exception to the rule that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is abolished. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31.
47. 100 Wash. 2d at 281, 669 P.2d at 456. WASH. REv. CODE ANN § 4.92.090
(1986) states "[t]he State of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or propri-
etary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."
48. 100 Wash. 2d at 281, 669 P.2d at 456.
49. Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456. In a footnote, the court explained high level
discretionary acts. To determine whether acts were exercised at a truly executive level,
the court should apply the four-prong test established in Evangelical United Brethren
Church. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31 and 145-50.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court noted that "[tjo fall within the exception ... , the discretion-
1325
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an emergency assistance call is an operational level determination sub-
ject to liability. 53
The Washington Supreme Court also recognized the creation of a
special relationship between plaintiffs and the county.5" The operators
assured plaintiffs after each call that assistance had been dispatched. 55
Since plaintiffs continually sought assistance, a nexus developed giving
rise to reliance on the part of the plaintiffs. 56 Consequently, the court
recognized plaintiffs' claim for damages pursuant to the special duty
doctrine.5 7
C. Municipalities Enjoying Immunity for Failing to Respond
to Emergency Calls
While some jurisdictions refuse municipalities and their entities
sovereign immunity for the performance of discretionary governmental
functions,58 others continue to protect municipalities from tort liability
regarding public safety decisions.59
ary act must not only involve a basic policy determination, but must also be the prod-
uct of a considered policy decision." Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456.
53. Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456.
54. Id. Plaintiffs also had alleged a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on grounds that
the duty owed by King County to provide assistance was owed to the public generally
and not to any particular individual.
55. Id. at 287, 669 P.2d at 458.
56. See Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365; Davis, 226 So. 2d at 452.
57. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash. 2d at 288, 669 P.2d at 458.
58. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). The State Fire Marshall
had undertaken an inspection for hazards in a hotel. He breached his duty to disclose
discovered hazards. Consequently, when a hotel fire injured patrons, the state was sub-
ject to liability. Even with a state statute immunizing the state from tort liability aris-
ing out of failure to perform discretionary functions, a common law duty was created
when an affirmative action was undertaken. See also Sorichetti v. City of New York,
65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), citing De Long, where a
special relationship was held to exist between the City of New York and plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs, a mother and her daughter, brought an action against the city arising out of
injuries they suffered at the hands of the daughter's father. The father refused to re-
turn the child, violating a protective order which restricted his visitation rights because
of previous abusive behavior. Despite awareness of the father's violent propensities
based on his past conduct, police ignored the pleas of the child's mother for her safe
return. The court decided this was adequate to establish an actionable duty to the
mother and daughter.
59. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 837,
207 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). After a San Francisco fireman left a fire station
1326 [Vol. 10
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In Trezzi v. City of Detroit,60 the Michigan Court of Appeals sup-
ported the decision of the City of Detroit to install a "911" emergency
system. Plaintiff in Trezzi complained that the "911" operators at-
tached an unjustifiably low priority rating to emergency calls.6e A
"911" operator passed the call to a police dispatcher who did not dis-
patch assistance for nearly one and a half hours.6 2 As a result of the
police dispatcher's dereliction, plaintiff's decedents suffered numerous
injuries, resulting in their deaths.6 3
The Trezzi court maintained that operating a "911" emergency
assistance system constitutes a governmental function by a municipal-
ity64 protected by Michigan law.6 5 The operation of an emergency dis-
patch plan is an indispensable element in managing a police depart-
ment. 6 The system's operation involves decision making regarding the
seriousness of each call for police assistance. 67 Immediately upon re-
ceipt of a call, an order of priority for response is attached.6 8 The court
determined that this type of system is unique activity associated with
unattended, a fire occurred at a building 300 feet from the station. As the response
time was greatly increased, it was alleged that unnecessary property damage had oc-
curred. The California Court of Appeal, First District, dismissed the complaint based
on the public entity's absolute immunity from tort liability for failure to provide fire
protection and/or from negligence in the provision of such protection. See also Hartz-
ler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). In
Hartzler, a woman allegedly called police twenty times concerning problems she was
having with her estranged husband. The court held that police enjoyed sovereign im-
munity from liability. In the absence of evidence showing that police promised the
victim protection and the woman relied on such promise, a special relationship had not
been created,
60. 120 Mich. App. 506, 328 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
61. Id. at 509, 328 N.W.2d at 71. There may have been a number of unidenti-
fied operators taking calls. Operators attach priority ratings to each call based upon its
nature, and police are dispatched accordingly.
62. Id. at 509-10, 328 N.W.2d at 71.
63. Id. at 509, 328 N.W.2d at 71.
64. Id. at 511, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
65. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 691.1407 (1985) (providing that all governmental
agencies shall be "immune from tort liability ... [in] discharge of a governmental
function ...").
66. Trezzi, 120 Mich. App. at 512, 328 N.W.2d at 72 (Bronson, J., dissenting).
The dissent asks the question "[i]f '911' system is 'indispensable' to police operations,
how did Detroit manage to muddle through the many decades in which no system
existed?" Id. at 517, 328 N.W.2d at 74.
67. Id. at 512, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
68. Id. at 513, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
1327
9
Bates: 911: The Call That No One Answered
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
operation of a police department. 69 Logically, the city and its police
department are afforded immunity.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same re-
sult as Trezzi but through different reasoning.70 Plaintiffs in Warren v.
District of Columbia,7 ' two of whom were sharing a third floor room,
all resided in the same boarding house.7 2 The third plaintiff and her
daughter occupied a second floor room. 3 During the night, the sound
of the back door being broken down awakened the women.7 4 Two men
entered the house, made their way to the second floor, then raped and
sodomized one of the plaintiffs. 5
Hearing screams from the floor below, plaintiffs on the third floor
telephoned police, requesting immediate help. The police dispatcher
provided assurance that police assistance would be dispatched
promptly. From their third floor room, plaintiffs crawled through their
window to an adjoining roof. Four police cruisers, responding to the
broadcast, arrived at the boarding house. While on the roof plaintiffs
watched the police arrive, conduct a cursory investigation and then
leave the scene.7 6
Plaintiffs crawled back inside their room and again phoned for
help. Once more they were assured that police assistance was on the
way.7 Believing police had arrived, and in an attempt to ascertain the
conditions of the victimized women, plaintiffs called to the second floor,
thereby alerting the intruders to their presence. The abductors then
forced all three women, at knife point, to accompany them to an apart-
ment belonging to one of the men. The abductors held the three women
captive for fourteen hours, robbing and sexually assaulting them.
The three plaintiffs instituted actions against the city and its police
department. Plaintiffs based their claims on the negligent investigation
conducted by police once they were dispatched to the scene and the
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57. The court in Chambers-Castanes
flatly rejected the reasoning in Warren as being wholly at odds with its decision.
71. 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981).
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id. The two men who broke down the door were later identified and charged.
75. Id.
76. Id. One officer drove through the alley behind the house, and proceeded to
the front of the house without stopping. Another officer knocked on the front door, but
departed when no one answered. All the officers left within five minutes of their arrival.
77. Id. Actually, assistance was not dispatched the second time.
1328 [Vol. 10
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/12
1986]
failure to respond properly to the second emergency call. 8
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint. 9 The court in Warren based its opinion on
the "fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under
no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to
any particular individual citizen."' 0 The court denied plaintiffs' conten-
tion that their telephone call requesting assistance created a special re-
lationship.81 The police did not owe any single individual the duty to
provide police protection. 2 The acts and omissions of defendant police
department constituted no more than nonactionable withholding of a
benefit.8 3 Thus, without the establishment of a special duty, plaintiffs'
complaint could not stand. 4
The three dissenting judges in Warren"5 reasoned that if certain
factors are present, a general, nonactionable duty to provide police ser-
vices may narrow to a special actionable duty. 8 First, some sort of
privity must exist between the police department and the victim.8 7 This
relationship must set the victim apart from the general public.88 Sec-
78. Id.
79. Id. Notwithstanding their sympathy for appellants who were tragic victims of
despicable criminal acts, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
80. Id. at 3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided this case based
solely on common law municipal tort liability. At the time this suit was commenced by
plaintiffs, the District of Columbia had yet to waive sovereign immunity by statute.
The only limitation on any negligence action against the District of Columbia is gov-
erned by D.C. CODE § 12-309 (1985). In part, this section provides that "[a]n action
may not be maintained against the District of Columbia ... unless, within six months
... the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Commis-
sioner [Mayor] of the District of Columbia ... " This section of the code was never
referenced by the court in Warren.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. See also H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160,
159 N.E. 896 (1928). In Moch, the Rensselaer Water Co. had contracted with the city
to provide them with an adequate water supply. Plaintiffs property caught fire but
there was an insufficient amount of water to extinguish the fire. Justice Cardozo found
that the failure to provide an adequate water supply was, at most, an nonactionable
withholding of a benefit. Id. at 167-68, 159 N.E. at 897-98.
84. Warren, 444 A.2d at 9.
85. Id. Associate Judge Kelly wrote the opinion with whom Associate Judge
Moch and Chief Judge Newman concurred in part and dissented in part.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. See also Davis, 226 So. 2d at 451; Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365-66.
88. Warren, 444 A.2d at 10.
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ond, the public agency must have offered assurances which would cause
the victim's justifiable reliance.89
The dissenters in Warren asserted that the complaint alleged suffi-
cient facts which, if proven, established a legal relationship.90 The po-
lice department owed a special duty to the plaintiff placing the emer-
gency call. Also, after receiving guarantees on two separate occasions
that help was dispatched, the victims chose not to leave the scene, justi-
fiably relying on the dispatcher's assurances that help was coming.
Therefore, the dissenters concluded that an actionable special duty
existed. 1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also refused to acknowledge
the existence of a special duty in Doe v. Hendricks.92 The court denied
the award of damages to a boy who had been sexually assaulted by a
stranger, even though a call for assistance was placed immediately af-
ter the boy's abduction. 3 Stating that police owed no special duty to
the boy, the court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.94
In rationalizing its position, the Doe court applied the two-step
special duty test.9" The majority decided no relationship existed be-
tween police and the boy. 6 No prior circumstances between the victim
and the officer imposed a duty on the police to protect the boy. 7 In
addition, police made no specific promises which would create justifia-
ble reliance on the part of the victim.98 Thus, without a special rela-
89. Id. See Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365-66.
90. 444 A.2d at 12.
91. Id.
92. 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979).
93. Id. at 500, 590 P.2d at 649. Two teenagers witnessed the youth being drag-
ged into an abandoned house by an adult male. The teenagers relayed their story to
their brother and sister. The sister called police and further relayed the story. The
dispatcher took the message into the office of the chief. The chief was the only officer
available to answer the call. However, the chief was in conference with an out-of-state
sheriff and did not respond to the call. When assistance did not arrive, the two boys ran
to the police station, relayed their story to another officer, who proceeded to the house,
and effectuated the arrest.
94. Id. at 500, 590 P.2d at 649. The court relied on the Peace Officers Liability
Act of 1973, N.M. STAT. ANN.f § 39-8-2, 39-8-4 (repealed 1976). The Act was
designed to protect officers from personal liability arising out of acts committed during
the performance of their activities and within the course and scope of their profession.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.





Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/12
19861
tionship or justifiable reliance, the only duty owed by police was a non-
actionable public duty.9"
II. Florida's Response to Municipal Liability In Failing to
Answer Emergency Asisstance Calls
Florida courts have yet to answer the question of whether a munic-
ipality is liable for failing to properly respond to an emergency assis-
tance call. With a statute that encourages Florida counties to install
"911" emergency systems,100 and a statute that permits the state and
its entities to be sued, 10 1 Florida courts will eventually face this
predicament.
In 1974, the Florida legislature enacted the Florida Emergency
Telephone Act.102 The Act's purpose is "to shorten time required for a
citizen to request and receive emergency"10 3 medical or police assis-
tance. Prior to this enactment, thousands of emergency assistance num-
bers were used statewide.104 The implementation of a three-digit num-
ber system immensely benefits both law enforcement agencies and
public service personnel.10 5
The enactment of the Florida Emergency Telephone Act gave a
statewide system of emergency assistance to the general public. The
plan includes a firm implementation schedule requiring local communi-
ties to direct the telephone utility to install a "911" system within
twenty-four months following receipt of a local government order.,,"
The system must include specific local government requirements for
99. Id. The court said, "[i]f and when the people of New Mexico desire a change
in the public vs. special duty concept, they must seek relief from the legislature...
[that] fix[es] the public policy of the State." Id. at 503, 590 P.2d at 651.
100. See supra note 8.
101. See supra note 9.
102. FLA. STAT. § 365.171(1) (1985).
103. Id. § 365.171(2).
104. Id. This "simplified means of procuring emergency service will result in the
saving of life, a reduction in the destruction of property, and a quicker apprehension of
criminals." The legislature's intent is to establish an emergency "number (911) plan
which will provide citizens with rapid, direct access to public safety agencies ...... Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 365.171(4)(e). See also § 365.171(10) ("All public agencies shall as-
sist the division in their efforts to carry out the intent of this section, and such agencies
shall comply with the developed plan."); It is no longer mandatory for counties to in-
stall a "911" system. The expense of installing and operating a "911" system is too
great for some of Florida's rural counties. Telander, supra note 1.
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law enforcement, firefighting and emergency medical services, and may
also include poison control, suicide prevention and emergency manage-
ment services. 107
Lawmakers enacted legislation aimed at assuring an accessible
remedy to those in immediate emergency need. The majority of the
systems developed in Florida are extremely efficient.108 This is gener-
ally the reason a municipality encourages the use of the "911" system
as opposed to direct dialing. However, if a Florida municipality holds
out the "911" system as preferable to another system in time of emer-
gency, a question arises regarding the municipality's liability when the
victim dials "911" seeking help and none arrives.
The issues surrounding Florida municipal liability have not been
clearly decided. First, the Florida legislature, in accordance with the
State Constitution, waived sovereign immunity for tort liability for it-
self and for its agencies and subdivisions.10 In essence, the State per-
mitted itself and its agencies and subdivisions to be sued in tort for
money damages arising out of the wrongful acts or omissions of any
agency's or subdivision's employee while acting within the scope of his
employment."10 As long as the injured plaintiff retains eligiblity pursu-
ant to section 768.28,"' he may sue the governmental entity as if the
entity were an individual." 2
The statute also allows the state to be self-insured by allowing it to
purchase liability insurance for whatever coverage it chooses in antici-
107. Id. at § 365.171(4)(b).
108. Florida 911 Program, supra note 1, at 2. At least seven Florida counties
have an enhanced "911" (E911) system. This system includes selective routing which
guarantees that only the calls originating within a certain jurisdiction are routed to the
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) responsible for that particular jurisdiction.
E911 systems also include automatic number identification (ANI) which provides the
dispatcher with a display of the caller's telephone number and automatic location iden-
tification (ALI) which provides a display of the caller's address.
109. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 768.28(6)(a). This section states that "[a]n action may not be insti-
tuted against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant
presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency. . . ." Section 5 further pro-
vides that the state is not liable for punitive damages or interest for the period before
judgment. Also, the state is not liable to any one person for a claim exceeding $100,000
or a total of claims in excess of $200,000. Section 7 further states that "process shall
be served upon the head of the agency. . . ." In addition, Section 9(a) provides that
individuals, unless acting maliciously and willfully, shall not be held personally liable.
112. Id. § 768.28(2).
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pation of any claim.113 Agencies, subdivisions and sheriffs may
purchase liability insurance together, or jointly provide other means of
protection against tort liability arising out of their official capacity.11 4
The language of section 768.28 is explicit with respect to the state's
desire to retreat from the doctrine of sovereign immunity and allow
compensation for valid claims arising against the state.
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, does not interpret section
768.28 as totally abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,115 the Florida Su-
preme Court had an opportunity to construe the sovereign immunity
statute. The supreme court decided that section 768.28 was broadly
written and the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not totally
abolished.116
Commercial Carrier Corp. reached the Florida Supreme Court117
on writ of certiorari where it was consolidated with a Third District
Court of Appeal case, Cheney v. Dade County.118 Commercial Carrier
Corporation and its insurer were named defendants in a wrongful death
action. 1 9 Commercial Carrier Corporation then filed a third-party
complaint naming Indian River County and the Florida Department of
Transportation (DOT) as third-party defendants.1 20 DOT failed to in-
stall a stop sign or provide pavement markings at the intersection
where the accident occurred.1 21 The third-party complaint sought con-
113. Id. § 768.28(13).
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
116. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1015.
117. Id. at 1012-13. Commercial Carrier Corp. allegedly was in conflict with
Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In
Gordon, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a city could be liable for negli-
gence in design, construction or maintenance of streets, but that it could not be liable
for failing to install traffic devices at an intersection.
118. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.), vacated, 372 So. 2d
1182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In Cheney, a third party complaint had been filed
by Cheney and its insurer against Dade County. The complaint alleged that the sole
cause of an intersection collision was Dade County's negligence in maintaining the in-
tersection with proper traffic signals. The trial court held that no cause of action ex-
isted to maintain the third party complaint. The Third District Court, while upholding
the dismissal, certified the question as one of great public interest.
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tribution and indemnification from Indian River County and DOT for
their negligence in failing to properly maintain the intersection.122 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the third-party complaint. 123
The main issue the Commercial Carrier Corp. court addressed
was the status of municipal tort liability under the governmental versus
proprietary analysis since the enactment of section 768.28.12 The su-
preme court concluded that because section 768.28125 unequivocally in-
cludes municipalities within the definition of state entities subject to
waiver of immunity,126 this distinction died when Section 768.28 be-
came law. In the same breath, the Commercial Carrier Corp. court
also decided that the special duty-general duty dichotomy had no con-
tinuing vitality since section 768.28 became effective. 127 Traditional
municipal tort liability in Florida was subject to a third analysis. l2 8
The Florida Supreme Court adopted a test that considers certain
discretionary governmental functions as either planning-level or opera-
tional-level functions. Planning-level functions enjoy immunity from
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1015-16. See also Note, supra note 14, at 364-67; Note, The Doc-
trine of Sovereign Immunity Is Alive and Well, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 377, 378-80
(1980).
125. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1985) states: "(2) As used in this act, 'state agen-
cies or subdivisions' including the executive departments, the Legislature, the judicial
branch (including public defenders), and the independent establishments of the state;
counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the state, counties or municipalities."
126. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1016.
127. Id. "Predicating liability upon the 'governmental-proprietary' and 'special
duty-general duty' analyses has drawn severe criticism from numerous courts and com-
mentators." Id. at 1016, n.8. Therefore, "Modlin and its ancestry and progeny have no
continuing vitality subsequent to the effective date of section 768.28." 371 So. 2d at
1016.
128. Another problem the Commercial Carrier Corp. court faced was Section
768.28, which unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1975), does
not contain an express exception for discretionary acts to which immunity attaches.
The court responded, however, that the absence of a "discretionary exception" in the
waiver statute does not necessarily preclude immunity. Certain areas of governmental
conduct must remain immune from judicial scrutiny. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371
So. 2d at 10 17-18. See infra text accompanying notes 135-39 for application of the test
established in Evangelical United Brethren Church. See also Evangelical United
Brethren Church, 67 Wash. 2d at 246, 407 P.2d at 440; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579,
167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
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tort liability and comprise those basic policy decisions in which a gov-
ernmental branch makes a conscious decision, balancing the risks and
advantages.1 29 Operational-level decisions are characterized as those
made on an every day basis implementing broad policy plans. 130 Opera-
tional-level decision-making remains subject to tort liability.131
To assist the lower courts in their understanding of the distinction
between planning-level or operational-level decisions, the Commercial
Carrier Corp. court recommended application of a four question test
established in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State.32 The
four question test asks: (1) Does the challenged act necessarily involve
a basic governmental program? (2) Is the act or decision essential to
the accomplishment of that program as opposed to one which would
change the course of the program? (3) Does the act or decision require
the exercise of a basic policy evaluation, expertise or judgment? (4)
Does the governmental agency have the constitutional or statutory au-
thority to make this decision? If all four preliminary questions clearly
and unequivocally draw affirmative responses, the challenged discre-
tionary act is not likely to be subject to tort liability. If one or more of
the questions suggest a negative answer, depending upon the facts of
the case, further inquiry may be necessary.133
In the event a Florida court were confronted with a tort action
arising out of the mishandling of an emergency assistance call, the
129. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
Two examples of planning-level decisions are Elmer v. City of St. Petersburg, 378 So.
2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla.
1985). In Elmer, the city allegedly failed to give its citizens adequate warnings of riot
conditions; this was a discretionary, planning-level decision, not to incite community
havoc, cloaked with immunity. In Everton, an officer's choice not to issue a citation to
an intoxicated driver and to allow him to continue his travels rather than arrest him
was discretionary and cloaked with sovereign immunity.
130. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 1982). Two
examples of operational-level decisions are Weisburg v. City of Miami Beach, 383 So.
2d 1158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) and Sintros v. LaValle, 406 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Weisburg held that a police department's decision to have its
officers direct traffic is an operational-level decision subject to tort immunity if negli-
gently conducted. Sintres held that a government employee's operation of a vehicle
within the scope of his employment is an operational-level decision subject to tort
liability.
131. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019.
132. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
133. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019. The test established in Ev-
angelical United Brethren Church was applied by the Washington Supreme Court in
Chambers-Castanes. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57.
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analysis adopted by the Commercial Carrier Corp. court should be the
controlling precedent.13 4 If, for instance, a Florida resident dials "911"
to report an emergency situation, an operator will likely answer, provid-
ing assurance that assistance will be dispatched. If the operator negli-
gently dispatches police to the wrong address, causing a delay resulting
in injury, the victim may file suit against the police department and the
county as defendants in a civil suit for damages.
The liability of the police department and the county rests with a
court's determination of whether operating a "911" emergency system
is a judgmental, policy making decision, or whether the operation of
the "911" system is merely the implementation of a broad policy deci-
sion subject to tort liability. Defendants should move for dismissal and
a court should base its decision on Commercial Carrier Corp. and its
progeny.
In all likelihood, a court will apply the four prong Evangelical
United Brethren Church test adopted by Commercial Carrier Corp.:
First, does the challenged act necessarily involve a basic governmental
program? 13 5 In the hypothetical, the county and the police department
developed a system of law enforcement designed to secure safety to the
public. The "911" system is part of that overall plan. The language of
the Florida Emergency Telephone Act also indicates that the imple-
mentation of a statewide "911" emergency system involves broad pol-
icy or planning decisions.
Second, is the act or decision essential to the accomplishment of
that program as opposed to one which would change the course of the
program?1 38 Discretion is fundamental; any limit on discretion would
greatly hinder a system of law enforcement. Also, the directing of
emergency assistance to people in need is the primary goal of the
"911" statute. The plan is designed to serve the public, as are the pub-
lic service agencies responsible for responding to calls for help. There-
fore, broad tort liability would defeat the program's objective.
Third, does the act or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, expertise or judgment? 37 Because most decisions in law en-
forcement affect the rights of citizens, there is a great need for exper-
tise, evaluation and judgment in these decisions. The decision to dis-
134. Evangelical United Brethren Church, 407 P.2d at 445; Commercial Carrier
Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019.
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patch help to a resident as quickly and efficiently as possible is but a
small part of an entire system designed to provide public services. How-
ever, to attach liability where calls are mishandled would undermine
the entire system.
Lastly, does the governmental agency have the constitutional or
statutory authority to make the decision? 13 8 The Florida Emergency
Telephone Act encourages municipalities to adopt the "911" system.
Thus, each municipality has an affirmative duty to establish a compre-
hensive, statewide emergency assistance plan. Also, law enforcement is
given a high level of discretion, because to do otherwise would cause
the system to undergo substantial unknown changes.
With affirmative responses to all four prongs of this preliminary
test, a court, with a reasonable degree of assurance, would classify this
as discretionary, nontortious, governmental conduct. Thus, it would be
a planning-level decision cloaked with sovereign immunity.
The preceding example illustrates that under the Commercial Car-
rier Corp. rationale, the municipality in the hypothetical would be free
from liability. Although the resident properly dialed "911" and re-
ported a burglary, inadequate attention to his call resulted in financial
and physical injury.
Further evidence of the Florida Supreme Court's desire to immu-
nize municipalities from tort liability is found in a recent court opinion,
Trianon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeah. In Trianon Park,"39
due to a severe roof leakage and other building defects, the condomin-
ium owners sustained extensive damage to their property. The owners
brought an action against the City of Hialeah, alleging that the city
was negligent in inspecting the condominiums and in enforcing specific
provisions of the building code pursuant to the city's police power.
Recognizing sovereign immunity for the city, the supreme court
held that the sovereign immunity statute did not create any new causes
of action, "but merely eliminated the immunity which prevented recov-
ery for existing common law torts committed by the government." 40
As the city did not owe a common law duty to the individual owners
for the enforcement of police power functions, it was unnecessary for
the court to reach the planning level versus operational level analysis.
The lack of a common law duty to exercise police power functions,
138. Id.
139. 423 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla.
1985).
140. 468 So. 2d at 914.
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which include building inspections, immediately immunizes the city
from tort liability. The supreme court did, however, state that where a
common law duty existed, or where a statutory duty had been created,
application of the four prong test developed in Evangelical United
Brethren Church141 was necessary to determine whether the city acted
in furtherance of a planning-level or operational-level function. 4 '
The Trianon Park decision suggests that should a court determine
the state's creation of a "911" emergency system constitutes an exer-
cise of a police power function, a common law duty to provide emer-
gency assistance does not exist, and immunity from a negligence action
arising out of a mishandled "911" emergency call would be afforded
the city. However, should the court determine that "911" emergency
assistance could be provided by private persons as well as governmental
entities, the court, recognizing a common law duty, would determine
municipal tort liability in accordance with Commercial Carrier Corp.
and its progeny.'4 3 Application of either rationale ultimately produces
harsh results for the victim.
When a municipality decides to adopt a plan for emergency tele-
phone assistance, decided authority leaves little doubt that the munici-
pality has made a decision for which immunity attaches. Whether im-
munity is justifiable because of the public duty doctrine,144 or because
the decision is quasi-legislative or legislative, 45 or because it is a plan-
ning-level function,' 46 the activity remains immunized from judicial
scrutiny.
However, the addition of other factors, such as those presented in
the hypothetical, invoke the need to reexamine the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Since the Florida legislature enacted the "911" plan, more
than one-half of municipalities statewide have adopted the system. 47
The systems are highly sophisticated and efficient, shortening response
time for calls and providing more protection for the victim.' 48 When a
"911'" call is placed in some counties, the residence from which the call
141. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
142. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 918-19.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 117-31.
144. Warren, 444 A.2d at 4; Doe, 92 N.M. at 503, 590 P.2d at 651. See also
supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
145. Hargrove, 96 So. 2d at 133. See also supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
146. Payne v. Broward County, 437 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
affd, 461 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1985).
147. Florida 911 Program, supra note 1, at 1.
148. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 25.
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originated is immediately recorded by computer and operators know
the immediate source of the call. 149 Most counties utilizing "911" sys-
tems urge their use as opposed to direct dialing to police. These and
many other factors establish a nexus between the public and the public
service agencies. As such a nexus is necessary to create an actionable
duty, the coalition of all these factors may impose liability on a
municipality.
Individuals dialing "911" in times of crisis are relying on the sys-
tem to afford themselves needed assistance. Injustice occurs if these
individuals, not given assistance when dialing "911", are refused com-
pensation for their injuries because the acts of the municipality are im-
mune from tort liability. This injustice calls for a re-evaluation of mu-
nicipal sovereign immunity in Florida.'
Decisions that followed the Commercial Carrier Corp. rationale
have left the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Florida in a confused
state. There is uncertainty among lower courts as to what constitutes
judgmental, nontortious planning-level functions. Commercial Carrier
Corp. calls for a case-by-case application of the test emanating from its
opinion, 51 so that a victim of a municipality's negligence for failing to
properly handle a "911" emergency call could be entitled to compensa-
tion, although it is unlikely he will receive it. Compensation for injuries
resulting from mishandling of a "911" call is unlikely. Yet, the munici-
pality, rather than the individual, is in a better financial position to
bear the loss for injuries resulting from its own negligence. The time
for victims to be compensated for injuries arising out of a municipal-
ity's negligent operation of a public service function is upon us. The
Florida Supreme Court must eliminate confusion in the lower courts by
clarifying the applicability of sovereign immunity to municipalities.
152
149. Id.
150. The scope of this article does not purport to be all inclusive. There could be
instances when the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be applicable. For example,
should an emergency call not be communicated because the "911" computer system is
nonfunctional or because telephone lines are down, the municipality should not be lia-
ble for injury resulting from the "911" call not being handled properly. Injury in this
instance is not the fault of the municipality. But see Galuszynski v. City of Chicago,
131 Ill. App. 3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Twenty-four minutes
elapsed from the time the "911" call was placed until police responded. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' action for failing to allege the existence of a special duty owed by
the police department to complainants.
151. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1022.
152. Before Payne was decided by the Florida Supreme Court, the Fourth Dis-
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The planning-level versus operational-level dichotomy may be the ra-
tionale for deciding municipal tort liability, but it must first be under-
stood before it can be effectuated.
Legislative action would be an alternative solution to the supreme
court's reluctance to clarify confusion circling municipal sovereign im-
munity. The legislature has the power to express to Florida courts its
intent behind section 768.28.153 The Commercial Carrier Corp. court
has carved out an exception to the waiver statute. Since then, district
courts have followed suit by carving out exceptions to the Commercial
Carrier Corp. opinion. To rectify a situation which has left Florida
courts clueless as to the meaning of municipal sovereign immunity, and
a situation which disfavors compensation to individuals injured because
of municipal negligence, the Florida legislature could take affirmative
measures to clarify the sovereign immunity doctrine. Without such ac-
tion, the position of a municipality and a victim remains uncertain and
confused. If the Florida Supreme Court continues to avoid clarifying
the Commercial Carrier Corp. decision, the Florida legislature should
act. It should exercise its official duty and pass legislation which pro-
vides victims of mishandled "911" calls to compensation for injuries
sustained by a municipality's negligence.
III. Conclusion
Municipalities nationwide are utilizing "911" systems to assure
community members rapid access to medical and police services. "911"
allows municipalities to dispatch emergency assistance to injured indi-
viduals with greater accuracy and efficiency. At the suggestion of local
governments, individuals in the community are dialing "911" rather
than direct dialing to receive emergency services.
However, a municipality's mishandling of an emergency call raises
the issue of whether tort liability should attach to this negligent con-
duct. As Florida has yet to deal with this issue, and other jurisdictions
are divided on the liability issue, an interesting problem may confront
Florida courts. The legislature encourages the use of the "911" system,
yet seemingly shields municipalities from liability for negligently oper-
ating the system. This legislative protection potentially creates a situa-
trict Court of Appeal said "continuing with our uncertainty as to the delineation be-
tween operations and planning ... [the] Modlin doctrine may well have been unsatis-
factory but at least we understood it!" 437 So. 2d at 721.
153. FLA. CONST. art. III.
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tion where a person injured as a result of a municipality's negligence is
denied compensation. A re-evaluation of the Florida sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, by either the Florida Supreme Court or the Florida legis-
lature, is the only opportunity an injured victim has to recover damages
resulting from this negligence.
Douglas L. Bates
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